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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael William Tappin appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his request for post-conviction counsel.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of Tappin’s
underlying criminal case as follows:
On January 11, 2012, Detective Andreoli, an undercover narcotics
officer, arranged to purchase heroin from Steven McDaniel. McDaniel and
a friend identified as “Mikey” were to travel to Seattle to pick up some
high-quality heroin which McDaniel agreed to sell to Andreoli upon their
return. McDaniel kept in contact with Andreoli and delivery was eventually
scheduled for January 14.
On that morning Andreoli, with a surveillance team standing by,
went to a gas station on Federal Way in Boise where he met with
McDaniel for the heroin delivery. McDaniel, however, could not complete
the sale at the time because he stated Mikey had his digital scale. Unable
to purchase a new scale elsewhere, McDaniel decided they should drive
to Mikey’s house and get his scale back. As they approached the house,
McDaniel had Andreoli stop the car so he could get out and walk the
remainder of the way, claiming Mikey did not want others to know where
he lived. The surveillance team observed McDaniel return from one of two
houses on the street. Upon his return, McDaniel directed Andreoli to drive
back to the gas station where he produced a digital scale and completed
the drug transaction.
During this time, the surveillance officers continued to observe the
two houses. A car, with its driver on the phone, pulled up and parked,
made a sudden and illegal U-turn and parked, then pulled forward and
parked again, all without signaling. Tappin exited one of the two houses
and got into the passenger seat of the car. As the car pulled away from
the curb, the officers made a traffic stop. As the stop began, officers
1

observed the passenger lean forward and reach his hand toward his
waistband or pocket area. Officers removed the driver and passenger
from the vehicle and the passenger identified himself as Tappin. An
officer asked Tappin if he had any weapons or contraband and for
permission to search his person. Tappin granted consent and the officers
found a bag containing ten grams of heroin in Tappin’s right front pants
pocket.
Tappin was charged with conspiracy to traffic in heroin, in violation
of I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(6)(C), 18-1701, 37-2732(b) and 19-304; trafficking
in heroin, I.C. §[§] 37-2732B(a)(6) and 18-204; and possession of drug
paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. Tappin filed a motion to suppress the
evidence gathered by the police as a result of the traffic stop alleging there
was no legal basis for the stop and no reasonable suspicion of any
criminal activity. After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied
the suppression motion. Tappin entered into a conditional guilty plea
wherein he pled guilty to the trafficking charge and the conspiracy and
possession offenses were dismissed by the state. Tappin reserved his
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion….
State v. Tappin, Docket No. 40377, Unpublished Op. No. 368, pp.1-2 (Idaho App.,
February 10, 2014). Tappin appealed arguing that officers unlawfully expanded the
scope and extended the duration of his traffic stop, making his consent ineffective. Id.
at 2-3. The Court determined that Tappin had failed to raise that argument below and
so had not preserved it for appellate review. Id. at 3-4. The Court affirmed the district
court’s denial of Tappin’s suppression motion. Id. at 4.
On May 12, 2014, Tappin filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he
alleged that both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. (R., pp.4-11.) Tappin also filed a motion requesting appointed counsel.
(R., pp.23-25.) The district court denied the motion after determining that Tappin had
failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim and his
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petition was subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). (See
R., p.28.)
After taking judicial notice of much of the underlying criminal record (R., pp.30,
52), the district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss Tappin’s post-conviction petition
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) (R., pp.53-65). More than 20 days later, the
district court summarily dismissed Tappin’s petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.7173.) Tappin filed a motion for reconsideration (R., pp.75-81), which the district court
denied (R., pp.90-94). Tappin filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of the
district court. (R., p.85.)
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ISSUE
Tappin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Tappin’s motion for
appointment of counsel since the petition alleges facts showing the
possibility of a valid claim?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Tappin failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to appoint post-conviction counsel to pursue his frivolous petition for
post-conviction relief?

4

ARGUMENT
Tappin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Motion To Appoint Post-Conviction Counsel
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Tappin’s motion for appointed counsel and summarily

dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he failed to allege facts showing
the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim and his petition was subject to summary
dismissal. (See R., p.28.) On appeal, Tappin contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his request for counsel, and argues that he raised the possibility
of a valid claim. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-14.) Application of the correct legal standards
to the facts of this case, however, demonstrates that Tappin failed to raise the possibility
of a valid claim.
B.

Standard Of Review
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed

by Idaho Code § 19-4904. “The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214
P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, “[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court
exercises free review.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting
Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)).

5

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Tappin’s Request For Appointed Counsel
Because Tappin Failed To Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). While a district court may, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 19-4904, appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in
certain circumstances, the court is only required to appoint counsel when a petitioner
“alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further
investigation on the defendant’s behalf.” Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152
P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In determining
whether the alleged facts justify the appointment of counsel, “every inference must run
in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho
at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. However, where the claims in the petition are so
patently frivolous that there is no possibility that they could be developed into a viable
claim, with or without counsel’s assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction
petition. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147
Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670.
In relation to this case, Tappin’s post-conviction petition alleged that both trial
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective, essentially, for failing to prevail on his
suppression motion. (See R., pp.5-6, 10-11.) With the benefit of hindsight, he claimed
that trial counsel should have called him to the stand to offer a counterfactual version of
events and that counsel should have pursued a different theory of the case, i.e., that the
scope and duration of the traffic investigation had been exceeded. (R., pp.5-6.) On the
6

other hand, he claimed that appellate counsel should have presented a different
argument than that the scope of the investigation had been exceeded. (R., p.6.) On
appeal, Tappin does not pursue the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. In
reality, none of Tappin’s claims were viable.
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154,
177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (citations omitted). “[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation.”

Id.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id.
The decision of what theories and issues to pursue is a tactical decision. Short v.
State, 135 Idaho 40, 42-43, 13 P.3d 1253, 1255-56 (Ct. App. 2000). At the suppression
hearing, Tappin’s trial counsel made the tactical decision to pursue the legal theory that
there was no basis for the traffic stop. (R., pp.61-62.) Now, in hindsight, Tappin thinks
his counsel should have instead argued that officers exceeded the scope of the traffic
investigation.

(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)

Attacking the scope of the investigation,
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however, would have been a very poor argument because, as the district court noted,
not only did it find probable cause for the traffic stop, but also reasonable suspicion for
the drug investigation independent of that stop. (R., pp.61-62.) The officers could not
exceed the scope of their drug investigation, based on reasonable suspicion, by
investigating Tappin’s connection to the drug sales.
Whether to call Tappin as a witness at the hearing on his motion to suppress is
also a tactical decision, as correctly recognized by the district court. (R., pp.59-61.)
First, as noted by the district court, Tappin never alleged that his attorney prevented him
from testifying; only that his attorney behaved unreasonably by not calling him to testify.
(R., pp.59-60.) As this Court has explained, “[t]he decision of what witnesses to call is
an area where we will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008) (citations
and internal quotation omitted). If his attorney knew what Tappin would say if called to
testify at the suppression hearing—as Tappin alleged—and then chose not to call
Tappin, then that tactical decision was not based on an objective defect, such as trial
counsel being uniformed or unprepared.
Second, even if Tappin had raised the issue as a deprivation of his right to testify,
his claim would still fail. While a defendant has a constitutional right to testify at trial in
his own behalf, the state is unaware of any statute or legal holding that specifically
extends that right to pretrial motions. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987)
(discussing sources of the constitutional “right to testify in one’s own behalf at a criminal
trial”); State v. Kuehl, 145 Idaho 607, 610, 181 P.3d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 2008)
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(discussing validity of defendant’s waiver of right to testify at trial); Cootz v. State, 129
Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same); I.C.R. 42(i)(2) (right to
testify at trial of contempt proceedings); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (“In trial of all
persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States … the
person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness.”). The state notes
that, citing to State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912, 908 P.2d 1211, 1219 (1995), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated in DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P.3d
1148, 1152-53 (2008), that “[a] defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to testify
in his own behalf.” However, following the citation to Fields shows that the Fields case
dealt with the right to testify at trial, not during preliminary hearings. See Fields, 127
Idaho at 911-12, 908 P.2d at 1218-19.
If the defendant’s right to testify is a trial right, and that right does not extend to
preliminary hearings, then the decision whether to present the defendant’s testimony at
a preliminary hearing is the same as any witness testimony. As noted above, that is a
tactical decision, see Payne, 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138, and Tappin would be
unable to carry his burden of showing the possibility of a valid claim.
Regardless of whether the right to testify at trial extends to preliminary motions,
Tappin’s proposed testimony, proffered with the benefit of hindsight, would still have
made no difference in the outcome of his case. In particular, Tappin’s assertion that he
did not consent to the pat-down search—which he highlights on appeal (Appellant’s
brief, pp.11-13)—would have been unavailing. As explained by the district court, such a
search “for officer safety reasons would have been standard” (R., p.63). On appeal
Tappin attacks the court’s observation as “dead wrong,” but in fact, under the
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circumstances of this case, it is Tappin who is mistaken.

Tappin’s premise simply

ignores that this was, as determined by the district court below, more than a mere traffic
stop; it was also a drug investigation based on independent reasonable suspicion. (R.,
pp.61-62.)

As recognized by the Court of Appeals, violence often accompanies

organized and ongoing drug transactions. See State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 121-22,
244 P.3d 261, 265-66 (Ct. App. 2010).

Considering the well-documented dangers

officers encounter when confronting ongoing drug crimes, a Terry1 frisk would have
been routine in this case.
Tappin failed to allege facts in his petition for post-conviction relief sufficient to
show the possibility of a valid claim. The central defect in his petition—that the facts
alleged showed only that, in hindsight, Tappin disagreed with his trial counsel’s
strategy—is not something that appointment of counsel could correct. Therefore, the
district court was correct to deny his motion for appointed counsel.
On appeal, Tappin also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
applying an incorrect legal standard, based on his reading of the district court’s order
denying the appointment of counsel. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.) It appears that Tappin
has misread the court’s order. The district court denied Tappin’s motion for appointed
counsel. (R., p.28.) It was correct to do so because, on the face of his post-conviction
petition (as shown above), Tappin failed to allege facts sufficient to show the possibility
of a valid claim. Nevertheless, the district court determined to go further than the law
normally requires by personally reviewing the file to see if Tappin’s petition could

1

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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survive summary judgment or if he had raised the mere possibility of a valid claim. (Id.)
If Tappin did either, the district court would appoint counsel. (Id.)
Tappin argues that requiring him to make a prima facie case sufficient to survive
summary judgment would have been more than the legal standard for appointment of
post-conviction counsel requires. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) While that is true, it is
also irrelevant. As it made clear in its order, the district court also would have appointed
Tappin post-conviction counsel had he only alleged facts sufficient to show the
possibility of a valid claim. (R., p.28 (“If the petition alleges facts showing the possibility
of a valid claim, counsel will be appointed.”).) That the district court reviewed the file to
see if Tappin’s petition met the higher threshold is immaterial because the district court
also reviewed the file to see if Tappin met the “considerably lower threshold” for
appointed counsel, and, had he accomplished that, the court would have appointed
counsel. Unfortunately for Tappin, he failed to meet the lower threshold of alleging facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim.
Because Tappin failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a valid postconviction claim, the district court correctly exercised its discretion by denying Tappin’s
motion for court-appointed counsel. The district court’s order denying counsel should
therefore be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
summarily dismissing Tappin’s post-conviction petition and denying his motion for
appointed counsel.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2016.

__/s/ Russell J. Spencer____
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of November, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: db@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.

RJS/dd

__/s/ Russell J. Spencer_______
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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